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ABSTRACT 
Our article extends the research on authoritarian neoliberalism to Germany, 
through a history of the Bertelsmann media corporation – sponsor and 
namesake of Germany’s most influential neoliberal think-tank. Our article 
makes three conceptual moves. Firstly, we argue that conceptualizing German 
neoliberalism in terms of an ‘ordoliberal paradigm’ is of limited use in 
explaining the rise and fall of Germany’s distinctive socio-economic model 
(Modell Deutschland). Instead, we locate the origins of authoritarian tendencies 
in the corporate power exercised by managers rather than in the power of state-
backed markets imagined by ordoliberals. Secondly, we focus on the managerial 
innovations of Bertelsmann as a key actor enmeshed with Modell Deutschland. 
We show that the adaptation of business management practices of an 
endogenous ‘Cologne School’ empowered Bertelsmann’s postwar managers to 
overcome existential crises and financial constraints despite being excluded 
from Germany’s corporate support network. Thirdly, we argue that their further 
development in the 1970s also enabled Bertelsmann to curtail and circumvent 
the forms of labour representation associated with Modell Deutschland. 
Inspired by cybernetic management theories that it used to limit and control 
rather than revive market competition among its workforce, Bertelsmann began 
to act and think outside the postwar settlement between capital and labour 
before the settlement’s hotly-debated demise since the 1990s. 
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Introduction 
 
Our article takes up the core concerns of the nascent scholarship on ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ (AN). Mobilizing the work of Stuart Hall and Nicos Poulantzas, the major 
contribution of this literature has been to highlight the disciplinary, coercive and anti-
democratic governance practices that political actors have used in the wake of the global and 
European financial crises to curtail opposition and close down alternatives (Bruff, 2014, 
2016). Crucially for scholars of AN, it is these practices that make neoliberalism much more 
pernicious and persistent than the free market programmatic frequently attributed to it by both 
proponents and sceptics (Bruff, 2016, p. 107; Tansel, 2017). The emancipatory purpose of AN 
is to lift the veil of this liberal rhetoric to reveal new mechanisms and techniques of rule and 
potential points of resistance that are too often swallowed up by the master narrative of ‘the 
market’.  
Building on the recognition of the spatially and temporally variegated character of AN 
(e.g. Rioux, 2016), this article extends this line of investigation to Germany. The German 
experience is of interest for two reasons. First, it has been the focus of long-standing debates 
about the roles of state power and market forces in the constitution of a distinct but possibly 
fading German model (Modell Deutschland) of capitalism (e.g. Thelen, 2014). And second, 
the German state has assumed a domineering role in the eurocrisis that some have likened to 
‘an authoritarian mode of action’ (Biebricher, 2013, p. 345). 
The most prominent way to link the specificity of Germany to its dominance in the EU has 
been to invoke an ordoliberal paradigm. Idolizing the strong state and free market, this variant 
of neoliberal thought is said to have shaped Germany’s ‘social market economy’ after 1945 
and to inform its contemporary crisis response (Blyth, 2013; Bonefeld, 2012; Young, 2014). 
This literature has revealed an intriguing correspondence between ordoliberal principles and 
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EU governance practices (e.g. Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2015) and the deleterious 
consequences of German crisis management (Ryner, 2015). And yet to us, the assumed fixity 
of ordoliberal dogma seems less able to explain either the specific social transformation of 
German capitalism after 1945 or the novel, if regressive, reforms that have undone these 
achievements since the 1990s. Thus, rather than search for continuity in the realm of ideas, 
our article proposes to examine the evolving socio-economic strategies and struggles of actors 
embedded in and yet reshaping the German social model. Building on contributions that 
examine the connections between business management and the rise of neoliberalism (Davies, 
2014; Knafo et al., 2018; Styhre, 2014), this article zooms in on the managerial innovations of 
the Bertelsmann AG – one of the world’s largest media conglomerates.  
The reasons for this choice are threefold. First, Bertelsmann is the corporate sponsor 
behind Germany’s foremost think-tank, the Bertelsmann Foundation. In the eyes of many, the 
Foundation emerged as the key protagonist in the transformation of Modell Deutschland since 
the 1990s, most often in ways that have diminished its social and democratic features (Barth, 
2006; Bauer, 2009; Biermann & Klönne, 2008; Böckelmann & Fischler, 2004; Schuler, 2010; 
Wernicke & Bultmann, 2007). There is, moreover, widespread agreement that the aims and 
methods of the Foundation have been shaped fundamentally by the corporate culture and 
management style of the Bertelsmann company (Schuler, 2010, pp. 14-21). In fact, the very 
raison d’être of the charity – created and headed by the firm’s patriarch, Reinhard Mohn – 
has been to apply the approaches and achievements of his business to the German state and 
society (Fleishman, 2001, p. 133). 
Second, while its social foundation is considered a neoliberal lodestar, the corporate 
history of Bertelsmann is deeply enmeshed in the preceding period of postwar reconstruction 
and the specificities of the Modell Deutschland. For many scholars, ‘Bertelsmann epitomises 
the West German postwar economic miracle’ (Fitzgerald, 2012, pp. 266-267), with Mohn 
representing a younger generation of managers who broke with the archaic forms of 
organization and leadership of the German business elite and transformed their businesses 
into multinationals (Berghahn, 1986; Ewing, 2014, p. 18). Among these corporations, thirdly 
and finally, Bertelsmann stands out by virtue of a uniquely adaptive management style. What 
set its corporate culture apart ‘from nearly all other management concepts in the early Federal 
Republic of Germany was the “radicalness” with which it embraced the element of permanent 
change’ (Wischermann, 2010, p. 262). Because it connects to both the rise of the German 
model after 1945 and its deconstruction in the 1990s, Bertelsmann’s corporate history throws 
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an innovative sidelight on the trajectory of German neoliberalism and its tendentially 
authoritarian characteristics.  
Our argument proceeds in three steps. The next section identifies some of the promises and 
pitfalls of the ordoliberal narrative, and outlines an alternative account which locates elements 
of authoritarian rule within corporate strategies and the managerial innovations of 
Bertelsmann in particular. In keeping with the emphasis within AN on hierarchies and 
inequalities rather than markets, we argue that these practices represent instruments of control 
and empowerment rather than means of market rule. Against the image of an externally-
generated movement towards neoliberalism, the third section identifies the roots of a German 
management tradition of accounting practices and profit incentives pioneered at Cologne 
University in the interwar period. In the immediate postwar years, this helped Bertelsmann 
establish an operational basis for its growing business when facing an existential crisis of 
financial constraints and excessive growth. The third section shows how, facing the limits of 
these techniques in the 1970s, Bertelsmann turned to cybernetic management theories in order 
to limit, rather than revive, competition amongst its workforce. While introduced in the name 
of social progress, these practices were meant to curtail the more institutionalized versions of 
collective bargaining and co-determination of Modell Deutschland long before its hotly-
debated demise. It is in this history that we can find the origins and complex objectives of the 
societal blueprint Bertelsmann introduced through its foundation in the 1990s. Our conclusion 
situates our argument within the broader literature on neoliberalism and managerialism. It 
outlines the advantages of searching for their authoritarian features within changing corporate 
strategies rather than unchanging ordoliberal ideology.  
 
 
German Neoliberalism: An Ordoliberal Legacy? 
 
The most popular approach to discerning the authoritarian tendencies of German 
neoliberalism zooms in on a peculiar economic doctrine called ‘ordoliberalism’. This German 
variety of neoliberal thought was conceived in the interwar period by a circle of economists 
associated with the so-called Freiburg School as a ‘third way’ between laissez-faire capitalism 
and potentially totalitarian economic planning. To its advocates, ordoliberalism prescribes a 
central but legally demarcated role for the state in sustaining a competitive market order based 
on price stability, fiscal sobriety, and monetary restraint (Ptak, 2009, p. 100). Its critics, 
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however, identify a latent authoritarianism that combines the tyranny of the market with that 
of the state. State power, in the ordoliberal imagination, is to be used to submit social actors to 
the logic of the market, to defend its price-finding function from popular ‘interference’, and to 
inculcate in the individual an ethos to contend with the forces of supply and demand 
(Biebricher, 2013, pp. 341-342; Bonefeld, 2012, pp. 5, 9). Political authority, in short, 
imposes an ‘order of competition’ at the expense of democratic participation, collective 
enterprise, and redistributive forms of welfare (cf. Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2015, p. 85). 
The corresponding narrative holds that Germany’s postwar social market economy was 
built on the basis of this ordoliberal paradigm after 1945 (for a nuanced analysis, see Dyson, 
2001). Although there is considerable disagreement over how much of ordoliberal thought 
was carried over into the postwar era (cf. Bonefeld, 2012; Berghahn & Young, 2013), many – 
though not all (cf. Hartmann, 2015, p. 125) – of its proponents suggest that since the crisis of 
Keynesianism of the 1970s, this paradigm has become a project that German state elites have 
aimed to realize at the European level (Art, 2015; Blyth, 2013, p. 101; Matthijs, 2016).  
While focused on illuminating German-led austerity and the rigid surveillance and 
enforcement apparatus of post-crisis Europe (see Biebricher & Vogelmann, 2017), the 
principal advantage of this account lies in its potential to uncover an internally generated 
rather than externally imposed neoliberal trajectory (Dyson, 2001, p. 140). This corrects a line 
of reasoning which holds that Germany simply followed a global neoliberal transition in the 
1990s. By drawing attention to a homegrown ideology of state-led and market-centred 
governance, the ordoliberal narrative goes some distance towards understanding the diverse 
sources, multiple trajectories, and varied forms of neoliberalism (cf. Bruff, 2008).  
However, the key problem, as we see it, is that many ordoliberal accounts are so focused 
on the current crisis that they neglect the past. Because their explanatory value rests squarely 
on the presumed continuity of ordoliberal thought, they tend to exaggerate its original 
influence on Germany’s postwar political economy. To be sure, ordoliberal arguments served 
as an important antidote to more far-reaching postwar plans for socialization and 
interventionism (Ptak, 2009). And yet in order to become acceptable again after 1945, 
capitalism had to be rendered ‘social’ in ways that marked a profound departure from 
ordoliberal precepts in several respects. In the place of the reactionary and proto-fascist 
exonerations of the state that shine through in key ordoliberal texts, a liberal-democratic, 
parliamentary and federal constitution was created (Berghahn and Young, 2013; Young, 
2014). In like manner, the aversion to social policy within the ordoliberal canon was replaced 
by a redistributive welfare state (Manow, 2001). Additionally, from an ordoliberal standpoint, 
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both the reconcentration of economic power in a tightly-knit network of big banks and 
industrial firms, and the inclusion of organized labour through corporatist arrangements 
would have to be judged as inadmissible ‘conspiracies against the market’ (Berghahn, 2010, 
pp. 5-6; Hien, 2013, p. 350; Nicholls, 1994, pp. 335-336). Lastly, the ‘massification’ of 
German culture and consumption, while part and parcel of the postwar economic miracle, was 
diametrically opposed to the social conservative ideal of a society of craftsmen and artisans 
that ordoliberal thinkers such as Wilhelm Röpke held on to (cf. Gööck, 1968, p. 184). 
In our view, these and numerous other examples demonstrate the critical difference 
between ordoliberalism in theory and the social market economy in practice. Taking the 
former as a guide to Germany’s postwar development risks missing out on some of its most 
distinctive features – especially the incorporation of organized labour – that have come under 
strain during the neoliberal era. Yet without a clear sense of what social institutions were 
established, we cannot fully understand how far, in what ways, and by whom they may have 
been eroded. 
In sum, there is no shortcut which takes us from the Freiburg School writings in the 
interwar period to the present. If we are to understand the contours of German neoliberalism 
and its authoritarian features, we need to work our way through the postwar history of and 
social struggles over German capitalism (see also Cozzolino in this special issue on Italy). 
Rather than debate the degree to which ordoliberal ideas were ‘lost in translation’ after 1945 
(Hien & Joerges, 2017) or experienced an ‘unlikely renaissance’ (Biebricher, 2013, p. 339) 
some decades later, we propose to focus on actors that had to manoeuvre within the social 
market economy as it actually existed, while at the same time contributing significantly to its 
transformation. We believe that Bertelsmann offers a productive focal point not only due to 
its social foundation becoming extraordinarily influential since the early 1990s, but also 
because its business history is intimately connected with the postwar reconstruction of 
German capitalism and the contestations between capital and labour during its evolution 
(Schreyögg et al., 2011, p. 95). 
The next section thus analyzes the corporate strategies and socio-economic context of 
Bertelsmann’s surge to power. We argue that its postwar success depended on managerial 
innovations which we trace back to a ‘Cologne School’ of business management, and which 
became vital because Bertelsmann lacked the corporate and financial support network that 
many established German companies enjoyed. Placed at one remove from the German model 
due to its newcomer status and peculiar business plan, these managerial practices enabled 
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Bertelsmann to circumvent and fundamentally rethink its constitutive capital/labour 
compromise.   
 
 
The Cologne Roots of Bertelsmann’s Surge to Power  
  
Critical scholarship on Bertelsmann does much to dispel the rhetoric of the long-standing 
‘social mission’ of Bertelsmann by revealing the corrosive impact of its reforms, the 
megalomania of its patriarch, and the complicity of his firm as propagandist and profiteer of 
German fascism (e.g. Böckelmann & Fischler, 2004). And yet, quite where Bertelsmann’s 
wider vision comes from, and what it seeks to accomplish, tends to be underspecified. Too 
often, the inquiry has been guided by some version of Berghahn’s ‘Americanization of 
German business’ thesis. Accordingly, Mohn is portrayed as ‘the Alfred P. Sloan of 
publishing’ (Gerschon, 1996; cf. “Reinhard Mohn”, 1987), modelling his firm on the business 
practices of General Motors (Wischermann, 2010, p. 261) and his think-tank on the Ford 
Foundation (Schuler, 2010, pp. 34-37). By contrast, our article takes up the ordoliberal 
proposition of internal impulses to reform along neoliberal lines, reaching further back into 
Germany’s history than previously recognized. Rather than an exegesis of ordoliberal texts, 
however, we identify a German managerial tradition of ‘ruling by numbers’ that had 
developed independently from the US during the 1920s (Fear, 2005), and that came to define 
Bertelsmann’s approach to capital-labour relations inside the firm and in German society at 
large (Bundesmann-Jansen & Pekruhl, 1992).  
The engine of Bertelsmann’s rapid postwar expansion is widely seen to be the mass-market 
book club. It offered its members a selection of titles at a considerable discount in exchange 
for a monthly subscription fee (Wössner, 1988, p. 150). Its secret of success lay in the 
innovative use of the door-to-door sales and mail-order publishing business which 
aggressively broadened its client base (Holtmann, 2008; Schreyögg et al., 2011, p. 89; “Die 
Bestsellerfabrik”, 1957). Though critical to Bertelsmann’s worldwide success, the exorbitant 
growth of its membership posed logistical and financial challenges that pushed the firm to the 
brink of collapse (Berghoff, 2013b, p. 859). Cut off from finance because book club 
subscriptions were not recognized as collateral (Gershon, 1996, p. 174; Tietz, 1985, p. 345; 
Wössner, 1988, p. 151), Bertelsmann lacked Modell Deutschland’s distinctive bank-based 
support network, commonly credited for corporate Germany’s postwar success.  
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  Despite the often-repeated claims by Mohn to have been influenced by American business 
practices (e.g. Wischermann, 2010, pp. 260-261), our research suggests that in this moment of 
exponential growth and existential crisis, Bertelsmann instead searched for more immediate 
solutions that were much closer to home. Confirming the intuition of Berghoff (2013b, p. 
866), our archival research reveals an as-of-yet unexplored connection to the German coal and 
steel industry via the person of Dr Willi Schoess. Hired in April 1955 to oversee and control 
the financial operations of Bertelsmann (Spiegel, 1957), what makes Schoess such a critically 
important figure is that he belongs to two influential and intersecting, distinctively German 
circles of business management theory and practice. 
  A student of business economics at the University of Cologne, Schoess was educated in the 
‘accounting and management tradition surrounding Eugen Schmalenbach’ (Fear, 2005, p. 
522). In the interwar period, Schmalenbach had pioneered a new standard of accounting that 
emphasized the profit/loss statement as the main device for assessing the commercial success 
of firms or divisions over time and against one another (Fear, 2005, p. 341). His key 
innovation was to elevate financial questions of profitability over technical questions of 
productivity, which gave managers a dynamic conception of a firm’s capital use rather than a 
static understanding of its assets (Fear, 2005, pp. 342, 627). 
  Schoess recognized the managerial possibilities of these key innovations compared to the 
prevailing ‘bureaucratic-conservative views’ of corporate organization (Schoess, 1936, pp. 
279, 280; Schoess, 1953, pp. 2, 23). He soon applied these advances at the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke, a major steel conglomerate, and the neuralgic centre of business management 
practice influenced by Schmalenbach and led by Heinrich Dinkelbach (Fear, 2005, p. 588). 
After serving in Germany’s war of aggression, Schoess was rehired by Dinkelbach in 1947 to 
create ‘the organizational preconditions’ for the allied-mandated decartellization of the coal 
and steel industry (Bertelsmann Corporate Archive, 1954, p. 3).  
Thus, Schoess brought with him a new set of financial accounting techniques that 
transformed the management of Bertelsmann and had far-reaching consequences for its future 
development into a multinational corporation and policy think-tank. His arrival in April 1955 
started a process of corporate restructuring that began with the separation of the central firm 
from the publishing house and the newly created sales group (Verlagsgemeinschaft). The 
resulting two-level hierarchy was connected with a ‘tighter organisation of accounting’ and 
intended to provide ‘greater transparency of the numerical data necessary for executive 
decisions’ (Bleicher, 1985, p. 62; Gööck, 1969, p. 161). Although he left the firm six months 
before this reorganization was completed in 1959, Schoess was commended by Mohn for his 
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‘accomplishments in the construction of the accounting system of the publishing house and its 
subsidiary firms’ (Bertelsmann Corporate Archive, 1958, p. 1). 
This reform was critical to solving Bertelsmann’s most pressing problem: the rampant 
growth of its book club exceeded the organizational capacities of the firm and jeopardized its 
financial and strategic planning. For a long time ‘the absence of proper budgeting techniques 
and profit and loss statements rendered the enterprise a risky venture’ (Tietz, 1985, p. 345). In 
this respect, the centralized accounting system Schoess introduced allowed Bertelsmann, for 
the first time, to take stock of its intangible assets of membership subscriptions and to explore 
what a company report from 1957 called ‘the still wide open frontier of an unknown market’ 
(quoted in Langenbucher, 1985, p. 41). 
  This new computational and managerial ability was also crucial in helping the firm manage 
the thousands of firms that acquired customers for its books. Initially tasked to recruit new 
and service existing customers on their own account, the marketing firms soon felt 
overburdened and underpaid and pushed for higher commissions and better conditions 
(Böckelmann & Fischler, 2004, p. 122; Tietz, 1985, p. 346). Under a new division of labour 
enabled by the accounting innovations, Bertelsmann reached a compromise: the sales 
companies not only received rent for each member they transferred to the sales group; the 
annual profits of the company were also divided up (Schaper, 1977, pp. 444-445). Though 
potentially more lucrative, this meant that the marketing agencies submitted to a centralized 
system of financial reporting that calculated and rewarded their relative performance 
(Berghoff, 2010, p. 29). This allowed Bertelsmann to gain the upper hand over an unruly but 
indispensable bunch of sales companies, whose intense and often dysfunctional competition 
with one another could now be organized, monitored, and fine-tuned in ways that would serve 
the interests of Bertelsmann (Lokatis, 2010). 
Lastly, the new managerial tools also provided a platform for the divisionalization and 
subsequent diversification of Bertelsmann. Between 1955 and 1959, the company embarked 
on a systematic strategy of operative decentralization (Langenbucher, 1985, p. 41) that 
followed Schmalenbach’s prescriptions. Based on his principle of ‘delegate but supervise’ 
(Fear, 2005, pp. 704, 706-707), Bertelsmann transformed its subsidiaries into independent 
‘profit centres’ while centralizing administrative functions such as finance, accounting, and 
budgeting (Bleicher, 1985, p. 62; Gööck, 1968, p. 188). This meant that their chief executives 
were now solely responsible for their domain while remaining subject to central supervision 
through financial accounting techniques (Berghoff, 2010, p. 28). One of Mohn’s close 
advisors recalled the ‘famous monthly enterprise statistic, developed over years according to 
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Reinhard Mohn’s conceptions’, comprising ‘the financial benchmark data of the enterprise, its 
divisions, and the profit centres, amended by specific indicators of the factors of success of 
the individual operations’ and providing Mohn ‘with a comprehensive overview of the state 
of business in a very short time’ (Luther, 1985, pp. 289-299; Bleicher, 1985, p. 62). The 
underlying power relationship was summarized by one manager, who noted ‘[i]f they meet 
their financial obligation to the company, they will have autonomy’ (Berghoff, 2013a, p. 186). 
 Overall, an enduring, if continually evolving, system of management was built on the basis 
of financial accounting techniques from the Dinkenbach/Schmalenbach school, which 
‘remained largely exceptional until the late 1950s’ (Fear, 2005, p. 737) and in the mid-1990s 
still set Bertelsmann apart in Germany’s business world (Albers, 1995, pp. 2, 3, 4 fn. 18; 
Göttert, 2001; Palass, 1992, pp. 316, 322). Compared to Germany’s industrial giants, which 
had used these managerial techniques in order to reintroduce a measure of competition and 
raise productivity, Bertelsmann was a medium-sized company that was only beginning to 
diversify its operations and expand internationally (Berghoff, 2010, p. 28). Crucially, these 
techniques enabled Bertelsmann to manage a still untapped consumer market based on a 
business model of intangible assets that few people at the time knew how to value and that put 
it outside the bank/industry nexus of the German model. While the toolkit has since evolved, 
we believe it had a lasting impact on the corporate strategy and social orientation of 
Bertelsmann. Because these financial accounting tools were so vital to the ability of Mohn 
and his chief executives to ‘read’ their firm and plan its expansion, they rendered Bertelsmann 
particularly receptive to future innovations in the field of management theory and practice. 
Transplanted into a nascent media corporation engaged in the mass-marketization of literary 
consumption, moreover, this new programmatic of ‘ruling by numbers’ would also enter into 
the image of corporate responsibility Bertelsmann developed in the face of public scrutiny 
and cultural criticism. 
In sum, we believe to have found in these managerial forms of power the seeds of an 
endogenous branch of neoliberalism that originates in Cologne and which – through 
Bertelsmann’s corporate success and a mandate to ‘educate’ German society – connects to the 
transformation of the German socio-economic model since the 1990s. How Mohn and his 
executives further developed this management system and defined their vision of society in 
response to the unruly 1970s is the subject of the next section. 
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Beyond Profit Incentives and Competition: Cybernetics and Managerial 
Power  
 
Bertelsmann was not only one of the first companies in Germany to repurpose managerial 
techniques for a sustained growth offensive; it also innovated with regards to the ultimate 
object of management, that is the discretionary power over the labour of others. Many 
established German businesses only reluctantly parted with patriarchal modes of corporate 
governance and workplace control (Berghahn, 1986; Hilger, 2008). A large number of them 
fought tooth and claw against the extension of work council rights and parity co-
determination that were enacted during the turbulent 1970s. Bertelsmann differed not in its 
opposition to these reforms, but in the managerial solutions it provided. Because it had 
depended on its workers as a vital source of funding, Bertelsmann had long sought new ways 
to incorporate, incentivize and control labour and to circumvent the institutions that defined 
its postwar settlement with capital in Germany. In the heated class context of the 1970s, the 
forms of profit-sharing and workers ‘participation’ Bertelsmann had pioneered to manage a 
mushrooming conglomerate and its workforce took on a wider significance.  
Ostensibly, the ‘social model Bertelsmann’ promised to interpose modern management as 
a mediating force between capital and labour, anticipating the reforms and rhetoric Mohn 
would promote through his Foundation in the following years. And yet a closer look reveals 
that it was premised on techniques that empowered managers at the expense of the 
representation and self-organization of labour. While part of a broader trend across the 
advanced capitalist world (cf. Duménil & Lévy, 2010, p. 78), our research reveals the specific 
challenges that Bertelsmann addressed, and that led to a more disciplinary way out of the 
temporary settlement between capitalism and democracy. Thus, while shifting the 
geographical focus away from the Anglo-Saxon area, we also highlight the emerging gaps and 
cracks underneath Modell Deutschland, details that are sometimes obscured by common 
assumptions about its social and economic progress. 
The material reasons for why Bertelsmann became ‘the first big company in Germany 
which gave its employees a share in profits’ (Schuler, 2010, p. 26) have been intimated above: 
Bertelsmann suffered from a chronic shortage of capital and the state levied a high tax of 60% 
on corporate profits. Cleverly, Mohn distributed Bertelsmann’s profits equally amongst his 
employees in the years from 1951 to 1955, on condition that they return them as a loan for an 
interest payment of 2%. This allowed Mohn to evade taxation and reinvest all of 
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Bertelsmann’s profits (Berghoff, 2013b, p. 86). In 1955, Mohn introduced a pension scheme 
that followed the same principle (Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 248). At risk of missing out on 
the postwar boom and excluded from the established networks of German business, Mohn had 
to tap into his labour force in order to generate the funds necessary to sustain the expansion of 
his book club. 
 More than a tax-saving trick, the profit-sharing scheme served as a continual source of 
Bertelsmann’s corporate expansion well into the 2000s (Berghoff, 2013b, p. 862; Jungblut, 
1972). This not only spurred workers’ motivation, as Mohn (1984) liked to claim (cited in 
Bundesmann-Jansen & Pekruhl, 1992, p. 180). As early as 1970 – two decades before the 
arrival of the neoliberal ideology of ‘shareholder value’ – these financial strategies also 
established profit maximization as a legitimate corporate goal (Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 
251) and engaged employees as shareholders. If one took Mohn’s rhetoric at the time at face 
value, one could think of these strategies as replacing ‘order’ with self-management, 
creativity and individualism (Lehning, 2004, p. 278), supplemented by communitarian values 
(for a discussion of neoliberalism and communitarianism, see Bieling, 2007). Indeed, we 
encounter these tropes in the 1990s with respect to the entrepreneurial subject and market-
based governance that his Foundation is said to have introduced into Germany (Barth, 2007). 
In our view, however, these managerial innovations were borne out of immediate concerns 
with the success of the firm rather than an intention to restore market rule. Hence, rather than 
ingrain a shareholder or market mentality in the individual, the main aim of the new 
managerial techniques was to cut it back to size. 
The problem was that the growing expansion and diversification of Bertelsmann in the 
1960s and 1970s had rendered the management of the organization increasingly imprecise. 
Indeed, insofar as greater competition between the profit centres had been introduced, it had 
detrimental results for the overall coherence and profitability of the company. Mohn and his 
successor at the firm and Foundation, Mark Wössner, argued that profit centres might run 
astray from the overall corporate objective precisely because the individual might prioritize 
their own profits over the goals of central management (Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 262). 
The development of carefully calibrated and regularly audited profit and risk-sharing schemes 
for employees and managers were not enough (Lehning, 2004, p. 278; Bundesmann-Jansen & 
Pekruhl, 1992, p. 34-35). To bring workers in line with the needs and wants of the firm, new 
management techniques were needed.  
A trained engineer, Wössner found a possible solution in cybernetic management theories 
(Glissmann & Peters, 2001, p. 95; Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 262), which had originated in 
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the USA but undergone a parallel and distinct development in German scientific and public 
debates after 1945 (Aumann, 2011). The core idea, as Wössner explained, was to ‘create a 
constantly reproducing and evolving Regelkreis [closed loop control]’ (cited in Hagemann-
Wilholt, 2016, p. 261) that would continuously synchronize the goals of individual workers 
and subsidiary profit centres with an overall corporate objective and regularly adjust that 
objective to a rapidly changing environment (Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 263).  
The overarching tool generated for that purpose was the Sozialbilanz (‘social stock 
taking’), a report that was first published in 1978 but prepared throughout the 1970s. The 
Sozialbilanz was supposed to measure how closely corporate objectives were followed in 
Bertelsmann’s daily operations and how far they accomplished the intended results. In cases 
of failure, managers could adjust the various profit-sharing schemes and means for workers 
participation. The aim was to establish an overall management system that could ‘learn’ from 
the actual operations of the company, address deficits as they occurred, and thus close any 
loopholes within Bertelsmann’s corporate universe (Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 261). In the 
eyes of its proponents, this provided a more ‘objective’ tool for setting company goals and 
making management decisions based on what was learned – according to Knafo et al. (2018), 
a core objective of new managerial strategies. Thus, we have a clear adaptation of the old, 
more rigid ‘ruling by numbers’ towards an evolving and decentralized ‘feedback’ system. 
Workers’ participation became a tool of systematic surveillance where the market incentive 
failed to ensure that the individual parts of the company worked as a whole.  
While the Sozialbilanz lost its central significance in the late 1980s (Hagemann-Wilholt, 
2016, p. 263), Bertelsmann has retained to this date its more traditional employee ‘suggestion 
system’ (Vorschlagswesen), which German corporations introduced at the turn of the 19th 
century but largely phased out in the 1960s. It enlisted individual workers in monitoring 
everyday operations as a way of controlling and optimizing their labour power and rewarded 
them for any corresponding cost savings (Wischermann, 2010, p. 242). Enshrined in a 
corporate constitution that promises social coherence and individual fulfilment, Bertelsmann’s 
corporate culture has become a ‘measuring instrument’ for upper management (Bundesmann-
Jansen & Pekruhl, 1992, p. 175; Lehning, 2004, p. 278).  
In sum, we argue that under the guise of increased participation, a new managerial form of 
continuous data collection, feedback and improvement was established which sought to 
ensure that new business objectives could be found and realized in a complex environment. 
For us, the real significance of Bertelsmann’s seemingly more ‘social’ workers’ policies lies 
in equipping its managers with extended powers to control labour in the interest of the firm so 
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that competition would not be counterproductive. At the same time, the accompanying 
discourse about self-fulfillment and self-responsibility provided a neat answer to public 
debates about labour alienation and workplace democracy in the contentious 1970s 
(Glißmann, 2001, pp. 94-95). It was on the basis of his unique model of workers participation 
that Mohn argued publicly against parity co-determination and the influence of unions in 
business operations (Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 252). 
Management, in the vision of Mohn and sympathetic social reformers, was posited as a 
‘third factor’ between capital and labour (Biedenkopf, 1985, p. 382; Glißmann, 2001, pp. 94-
95). The expansion of its influence was justified by this mediating role, which appeared 
increasingly important the more the postwar social partnership came under strain. Internally, 
however, Mohn left no doubt about where he stood, rejecting even modest steps towards a 
democratization of the economy as giving undue weight to labour. Bertelsmann’s income 
sharing and participatory schemes explicitly eschewed any legally enshrined, 
institutionalized, and collective decision-making power in favour of a vague and 
unenforceable employee ‘voice’, valued for their ‘harmonising effect at the expense of trade 
unions’ (quoted in Wischermann, 2015, p. 173). Rather than simply defend the prerogatives 
of capital, however, Mohn went on the offensive. By virtue of their managerial innovations, 
he explained, corporations like Bertelsmann presented a superior form of organization to the 
slow, cumbersome, and ineffective executive of democracy (Wischermann, 2015, p. 172). 
Thus, by 1980 already, Mohn advocated that the techniques his firm had crafted to organize 
power over subordinates and their participation in the enterprise could serve as a model for 
redefining the role of organized labour and restructuring the state apparatus of liberal 
democracies.  
It is from this point on that our story of Bertelsmann intersects with wider debates on 
managerialism as a form of neoliberal governance (Davies, 2014; Knafo et al., 2018; Styhre, 
2014). With Mohn’s transition from the top of the company to the Foundation, Bertelsmann 
joined the ranks of consultancies and companies elsewhere that – on the back of the 
systematic assault on the welfare state and organized labour in the USA and UK – aimed to 
disseminate new ideas and techniques into public governance that were drawn from business 
management (Bislev, Salskov-Iversen & Hansen, 2002). Future research will need to 
investigate Bertelsmann’s precise influence on the implementation in Germany of what has 
come to be known as ‘new public management’. Here, our contribution to this literature is to 
highlight the need to understand how managerial answers to labour and social struggles can 
show the twists and turns in corporate management and its implications for (state-led) 
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authoritarian rule. For the principal objective of Bertelsmann’s managerial innovations was 
never simply to introduce market competition, because it had often proved damaging to the 
strategies of the firm. On the contrary, the question for Mohn and his associates was about 
how to ensure compliance precisely because ‘market-based’ governance could not be trusted 
to lead to the aspired results (see Hagemann-Wilholt, 2016, p. 262; Knafo et. al., 2018). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has outlined the contours of a contribution that Bertelsmann has made to the 
neoliberal transformation of the German political economy. We find that due to its postwar 
expansion being difficult to finance, plan and steer, and because workers had to be brought 
into the firm’s financial strategies from the beginning in order to ensure its survival, from 
early on Bertelsmann’s executives came to see managerial innovations in the exercise of 
corporate power as the font and matrix of their success. These new techniques link back to an 
endogenous school of German financial accounting and, complemented by American 
cybernetics from the 1970s, forged a management system that emphasizes continuous control 
of its labour force and organizations in the name of social responsibility, workplace 
participation and income distribution. Long before the neoliberal turn under Thatcher and 
Reagan, Bertelsmann sought to retool capital-labour relations outside of the corporatist 
structures of Modell Deutschland. Thus, without denying the importance of the new 
management know-how which American consultancies brought to Germany (Hilger, 2000), 
our research has revealed an independent line of development that links Bertelsmann to a 
long-standing tradition of German business management. In this respect, our work goes some 
length in questioning the image of a global diffusion of neoliberalism, with its often implicit 
and sometimes explicit assumption that the USA and UK were the major centres of 
innovation (see also Bruff & Tansel and Harrison, in this special issue). 
Unlike the putative Anglo-American emphasis on the entrepreneurial subject and a 
shareholder society often assumed in this literature, we argue that market-based governance 
was never the primary objective of Bertelsmann’s managerial innovations. Instead, 
Bertelsmann’s managers found profit incentives and competition to be counterproductive to 
the overall objectives of the firm and thus had to be reined in. In its own ways, Bertelsmann’s 
corresponding managerial innovations empowered it, on the one hand, to understand and 
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manage the conglomerate and its labour force; on the other, they served to undercut the power 
of unions and work councils. It is this specific management system rather than a market 
model that we believe anchors both Mohn’s blueprint for German society and his influential 
Foundation, singularly shaped by ‘the leadership style and the approaches of business’ 
(Fleishman, 2001, p. 133).  
Emphasizing the specific corporate challenges of Bertelsmann, our search for the 
antecedents of its contribution has led us to Cologne rather than to Freiburg and yields an 
account that, while still requiring future research and elaboration, differs in important respects 
from the ordoliberal optic. First, our article approaches AN as a project to reshape German 
society in the image of corporate hierarchies rather than a state-imposed market order. This 
shift in focus not only dislodges the market as the be-all and end-all of neoliberal reform; it 
can also recast the capitalist state itself – including its executive and coercive apparatus – as 
an object of managerial reconstruction rather than a supreme authority towering above 
society. Most importantly in this regard, our study helps understand what state elites might 
have found appealing in managerial practices such as ‘new public management’. If 
Bertelsmann’s experience is anything to go by, it is the ability to exercise power in new ways 
rather than the dogma of the free market that is attractive. Future research along these lines 
ought to focus on how and why Bertelsmann’s managerial innovations have made inroads 
into German public administration since the 1990s, a fact often stated but rarely historically 
analyzed. 
Second, our analysis yields a more dynamic view than a narrative which conceives of the 
development of the German political economy in terms of an unchanging ordoliberal 
paradigm. Although our story also begins in the interwar period, it does not rule out that 
critical innovations and adaptations of the techniques handed down to Bertelsmann from this 
period have since occurred. As mentioned above, the types of managerial practices we 
identify have undergone further modifications, developing nominally ‘participatory’ and 
‘inclusive’ elements that conceal the corporate hierarchies from which they flow. But while 
certainly more flexible and difficult to track than an ordoliberal doctrine, we believe they are 
no less at odds with the ideal of a society governed by and for the people and thus – from the 
progressive outlook of AN – it is just as vital to comprehend and contest them as well as 
ordoliberalism.  
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